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What is it that confers a meaning to a sign? This is no easy question, but quite a 
number of philosophers seem to concur that the key concept here is that of rule-
following.
1
 But what is it to follow a rule? This is, once again, no easy question. 
What is worse, in the literature there is a well-known argument that purports to 
show that, in fact, there is no such thing. The argument in question is often re-
ferred to as “Kripkenstein’s Paradox” for while most commentators believe that 
Kripke was the first to discuss the argument, Kripke has maintained that its pater-
nity must be ascribed to Wittgenstein. Maybe the argument is Kripke’s, maybe it 
is Wittgenstein’s, maybe there is also a sense in which it is nobody’s argument: 
after all, Kripke’s attitude towards it is ambivalent, and among those who agree 
with him in ascribing its paternity to Wittgenstein some think that though the Aus-
trian philosopher actually discussed the argument, he did not believe it sound. Be 
that as it may, Kripkenstein’s conclusion has seemed unacceptable to most philos-
ophers, and his attempt to show that the notion that there is no such thing as fol-
lowing a rule should not be regarded as paradoxical, his “skeptical solution”, has 
not found many followers. My two cents is that while the pars destruens of 
Kripkenstein’s view (that is: the paradox) is basically right, its pars construens 
(that is: the skeptical solution) needs revision. The main goal of this paper is to 
provide such a revision. 
In the paper’s first section I briefly introduce Kripkenstein’s Paradox. After-
wards, in the second section, I explain why I believe that Kripkenstein’s skeptical 
solution needs revision and how I think it should be revised, and in the next two 
sections I outline two different strategies to carry this revision out. The paper’s 
fifth and final section is devoted to a brief discussion of the issue of semantic dis-
course. 
  
                                                          
*
 I would like to thank for their comments on previous versions Alan Sidelle, John Mac-
kay, an extremely helpful referee for this journal, and my audience at the I Perception, 
Memory and Imagination – where Keith Allen gave a very valuable response. 
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 As far as I can see, there are two different lines of reasoning that may be developed to 
support such a view. According to the first one the point is, on the one hand, that a sign 
having a meaning depends on the fact that people happen to mean something by it and, on 
the other, that the mental state of meaning something by a sign must be analyzed in terms 
of rule-following. According to the second line of reasoning the point is that a sign has a 
meaning only if there are rules for its use and to say that a linguistic rule exists is to say 
that there is someone who follows it. 
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1. Meaning Skepticism 
You can desire a new job without desiring any particular job, but you cannot fol-
low a rule without following one particular rule. Accordingly, Kripkenstein argues 
that there is no such thing as rule-following by arguing that there is no such thing 
as following one particular rule and not another one. 
Take, for instance, the rule governing the use of “green”, namely something 
like: 
 
An application of “green” is correct if and only if it is an application to 
something whose color is similar enough to the colors the objects of certain 





Now take the following Goodman-like rule: 
 
An application of “green” is correct if and only if (1) it was performed at or 
before time T and is an application to something whose color is similar 
enough to the colors the objects of certain paradigmatic applications seemed 
to have during the relevant paradigmatic application or (2) it was performed 
after T and is an application to something whose color is completely unlike 
the colors the objects of these paradigmatic applications seemed to have 
during the relevant paradigmatic application (see Goodman 1954, p. 74). 
 
Finally, consider a world W where the last time I used “green” was at T. 
Kripkenstein claims that at W there is no fact of the matter as to whether the rule I 
have been following in my use of “green” is the first one I listed, which we would 
all regard as “the real one”, or the Goodman-like rule. Since Goodman-like rules 
can easily be put together for any set of applications of a word, if Kripkenstein is 
right about this case his conclusion can be generalized: there is never a fact of the 
matter as to whether the rule I have been following in my use of a word is the one 
we would all regard as “the real one” or some Goodman-like rule. But, as I have 
noted at the beginning of this section, this would entail that there is no such thing 
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 Which, among the applications of “green”, are its paradigmatic applications? For the sa-
ke of simplicity, let us say that an application is paradigmatic if and only if (1) it is one of 
those by means of which the meaning of the word was originally determined or (2) it is 
an application to something whose color seems exactly like the colors the objects of the 
applications in (1) seemed to have during the relevant application. 
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as rule-following. Which, as I have stressed at the outset, would entail that there is 
no such thing as a sign having a meaning.
3
 But is Kripkenstein right? 
Of course, my having followed the “real” rule in my use of “green” cannot be 
identified with the fact that I applied this word to certain objects. Since the last 
time I used “green” was at T, these applications are unable to tell following this 
rule from following the Goodman-like rule above. 
But maybe there is something I said, or even just thought, that is incompatible 
with the hypothesis that I have been following a deviant rule. Take, for example, 
the case of “+”, and suppose that, at some point, I gave myself the customary re-
cursive definition of the addition function. Would not this be incompatible with 
the hypothesis that in my use of that sign I have been following a rule correspond-
ing to some deviant function? Well, only if in my definition “0”, “s”, etc… had 
their usual meanings. But Kripkenstein’s argument can be run for these signs, too 
– and so on. Which shows that in order to solve the paradox in its general form, 
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 Instead of a Goodman-like rule, we could use a Kripke-like rule such as the one that fol-
lows: an application of “green” is correct if and only if (1) it is an application to some-
thing outside the Eiffel Tower and whose color is similar enough to the colors the objects 
of certain paradigmatic applications seemed to have during the relevant paradigmatic ap-
plication or (2) it is an application to something inside the Eiffel Tower and whose color 
is completely unlike the colors the objects of these paradigmatic applications seemed to 
have during the relevant paradigmatic application (see Kripke 1981, p. 19). We could 
then claim that at W, a world where I have never applied “green” to something that was 
inside the Eiffel Tower, there is no fact of the matter as to whether the rule I have been 
following in my use of “green” is the one we all would regard as “the real one” or the 
Kripke-like rule, and so on as before – actually, all Kripke assumes in the passage cited 
before is that our would-be rule-follower has never entered the Eiffel Tower; however, 
this assumption is clearly unable to play the role Kripke assigns it in the argument, since I 
can apply a word to something that is inside the Eiffel Tower even if I have never entered 
it. Now, Kripke-like rules and Goodman-like rules are built following the very same reci-
pe. We start with the “real” rule governing the use of the word in question: p if and only 
if q. We then identify a condition that, so far, all the applications of the word have satis-
fied: let “r” be the name of the proposition that says that the application at issue satisfies 
the condition. Finally, we modify the “real” rule as follows: p if and only if (1) r and q or 
(2) not-r and not-q – well, actually, both Kripke and Goodman modify the “real” rule as 
follows: p if and only if (1) r and q or (2) not-r and s, where s entails not-q. Since the re-
sulting rules always sound very strange, in my 2012a I employed a different recipe. How-
ever, I now think that the cons of the strategy I embraced in that paper outweigh its pros. 
This is why in this article I came back to the classic recipe. This is also the place to note 
that there is reason to prefer Goodman-like rules to Kripke-like rules, since the former 
immediately make clear that Kripkenstein’s Paradox applies also to the cases the speaker 
has already dealt with (see Kripke 1981, note 34). 
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we must at least in some cases be able to solve it without any reference to what I 
said or thought. 
A less naïve way to try to meet Kripkenstein’s challenge revolves around the 
notion of a disposition. Consider the rule governing the use of “+”, namely some-
thing like: 
 
An utterance of the form “X + Y = Z” is correct if and only if Z is the value 
of the addition function for the arguments X and Y. 
 
And then consider the following, deviant, rule: 
 
An utterance of the form “X + Y = Z” is correct if and only if Z is the value 
of the quaddition function
4
 for the arguments X and Y. 
 
Finally, consider a world W where every time I uttered a sentence of the form “X 
+ Y = Z” both X and Y were smaller than 57. According to dispositionalists, what 
makes it the case that the rule I have been following in my use of “+” is the first 
one I listed is that my dispositions tracked the addition function – I was disposed 
to answer: “125”, not “5”, if asked for 68 + 57, and so on. 
Another prima facie more promising suggestion is that the argument can be re-
butted by employing the notion of a universal – or, following Lewis (1983, pp. 
375-376), that of properties that are more natural than others. A very simple ver-
sion of this suggestion is that the hypothesis that I have been following a deviant 
rule can be ignored simply because there are no universals corresponding to such 
rules – whereas, on the other hand, to the “real” rule for “green”, or to the “real” 
rule for “+”, there is a corresponding universal. 
Given that the focus of this paper is on the pars construens of Kripkenstein’s 
view, there is no need to discuss these other proposals,
5
 nor there is any need to 
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 I.e. X  Y = X + Y if X and Y < 57, X  Y = 5 if X or Y ≥ 57. 
5
 As far as I can see, the main arguments against semantic dispositionalism are (1) 
Kripke’s Argument from Finitude and Mistake, (2) the Ought Argument (i.e. Kripke’s 
Normativity Argument as rendered in, e.g., Glüer and Wikforss 2009), (3) the Non-
Inferential Knowledge Argument (i.e. Kripke’s Normativity Argument as rendered in, 
e.g., Zalabardo 1997 and my 2014), and – finally – (4) the Privileging Problem (for which 
see, e.g., Bird and Handfield 2008 and my 2012b, pp. 206-207). 
As for “the way of universals”, I take it to be clear that the version sketched in the text 
(which, e.g., Wright 2012 attributes to Lewis 1983) cannot work. If Kripkenstein’s point 
were, say, that there is no fact of the matter as to whether my next application of “green” 
is correct because there is no fact of the matter as to whether the color of the object of the 
application in question is similar enough to those of the objects of the paradigmatic appli-
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discuss the other ones put forward in the literature. The goal of this section was 
just to make clear the content of Kripkenstein’s thesis. I now turn to the issue I do 
want to discuss more in depth, namely: let us say that Kripkenstein is right and, in 
fact, there is no such thing as rule-following; can we live with such a conclusion? 
 
2. From Meaning Talk without Meaning Facts to Communication without 
Meaning 
In Kripke’s essay, a skeptical solution to a skeptical problem is defined by two 
features. First, instead of arguing that the skeptic’s conclusions must be rejected, 
we just try to prove that our ordinary practices do not require them to be false. Se-
cond, a good skeptical solution also shows that the notion that the entities the 
skeptic rejects actually exist comes from a philosophical misinterpretation of 
common language. Now, the remarks I am about to put forward can no doubt be 
seen as constituting a skeptical solution in roughly this sense. However, there are 
two differences between my skeptical solution and Kripkenstein’s which are 
worth stressing. First, in what follows I focus on the first of the two components I 
have just described, even though what I say in this connection should also make 
clear what is, in my opinion, the “philosophical misinterpretation of common lan-
guage” that lies behind the notion that there actually is such thing as following a 
rule. Second, and more importantly, the ordinary practices of ours I am going to 
focus on are not the ones Kripkenstein focuses on. Let me say something about 
this second point. 
The ordinary practices Kripkenstein wants to show as being consistent with his 
skeptical conclusion are those constituting what we can call “meaning talk”. The 
conclusion of Kripkenstein’s Paradox is that there is no such thing as following a 
rule. This entails that there is no such thing as a word or a sentence having a 
                                                                                                                                                               
cations, well, the proposal in question would have some merit: the color of the object of 
the application in question is similar enough to those of the objects of the paradigmatic 
applications if and only if it instantiates the universal green – which, unlike the universal 
corresponding to our Goodman-like rule, actually exists. But Kripkenstein’s point is that 
there is no fact of the matter as to whether my next application of “green” is correct be-
cause there is no fact of the matter as to whether the color of the object of the application 
in question should be similar enough to those of the objects of the paradigmatic applica-
tions: there is a fact as to whether there is enough similarity, but there is no fact as to 
whether enough similarity means that the application in question is correct. The version 
of the way of universals sketched in the text, therefore, will not do (for a somewhat anal-
ogous argument see Wright 2012, pp. 609-612). This is not yet to say, however, that no 
version of the way of universals can help us with Kripkenstein’s argument – for, of 




meaning or a person meaning something by a sign. And this in turn seems to en-
tail that all our talk of sentences having meanings and people meaning this rather 
than that by their words (that is: meaning talk) is completely unwarranted. What 
Kripkenstein wants to show is that this second entailment does not hold and that 
meaning talk has a role to play in our lives even if there are no meaning facts. 
Now, this is – no doubt – a legitimate demonstrandum for a skeptical solution. Af-
ter all, seeing that the existence of meaning talk provides no evidence for that of 
meaning facts can definitely help one come to terms with Kripkenstein’s skeptical 
conclusion. The problem is that there seem to be other reasons, reasons which 
have nothing to do with meaning talk, to believe in the existence of rule-
following, meanings, and the like. And one of these reasons seems to be very 
strong – way stronger, I submit, than the one provided by semantic discourse. The 
reason in question has to do with the very fact of communication. 
The point is that communication seems to require meaning – and rule-
following, etc… The idea has, I think, a great deal of intuitive plausibility, but it 
can also be supported with arguments. Consider, for instance, the following sce-
nario. I enter a grocery, take a couple of chocolate muffins, put them in a bag, and 
go to the counter. When the cashier asks me what is in the bag I answer: “Two 
chocolate muffins”, and she makes me pay for two chocolate muffins. The cashier 
understood what I said, so this is a case of communication. But how did that 
work? Here is a prima facie plausible explanation. The cashier knows that a sin-
cere utterance of “Two chocolate muffins” is correct if and only if that expression 
is applied to, well, two chocolate muffins. She also knows that her clients are ex-
tremely likely to, first, answer questions like the one she asked me sincerely and, 
second, use the expression in question correctly. This is why she concludes that in 
the bag there are two chocolate muffins. But if this is really the way communica-
tion works, then the very possibility of communication relies on the existence of 
correctness conditions for the use of the words of our language. And the existence 
of such correctness conditions presupposes that of meaning facts. Hence, it is at 
least prima facie plausible that communication requires meaning.
6
 
This is why I believe that the main goal of a skeptical solution to 
Kripkenstein’s Paradox should be to show that, contrary appearances notwith-
standing, communication does not require meaning. More precisely, my demon-
strandum will be that even in a world in which there are no meaning facts there 
can be communication, provided that another, quite weak, condition is satisfied. 
Again: this does not mean that I find the issue of the role of meaning talk in a 
world without meaning facts uninteresting. In fact, I will have something to say 
                                                          
6
 Note that even if Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not seem that interested in this problem, 
Kripke himself (see, e.g., 1981, pp. 11-12) clearly regards it as a rather serious one. Lewis 
uses an argument quite similar to the one sketched in the text in his 1980, § 2. 
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3. Communication without Meaning, Part One: a Model 
In this section I will develop what I think is the neatest strategy to prove that 
communication does not require meaning. In the next section, I will present a se-
cond argument. Let us start by considering the following example (see Wittgen-
stein 1953, part 1, § 2). A builder, let us call him “α”, is building a house and his 
assistant, let us call him “β”, has to pass him blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams in 
the order in which his boss expects to need them. In order to speed up the work, 
the two, who up to now had none, build a language. But α and β live in a 
Kripkensteinian world: there is no fact of the matter as to whether the rules they 
follow in their use of the words of their language are the ones we would regard as 
the most natural or rules we would regard as deviant, there is no fact of the matter 
as to whether their rule for “qlock” – a word that, so far, they have applied only to 
blocks – is (just like) our rule for “block” or some Goodman-like rule, there is no 
fact of the matter as to whether what they mean by the words of their language is 
what we would think or not, there is – finally – no fact of the matter as to whether 
the meaning they attach to “qlock” is the one we attach to “block” or some devi-
ant meaning. However, α and β share what we may call “a common animal na-
ture”; α shouts: «Qlooock!» if and only if he wants a block,8 and β brings α a 
block if and only if he hears him shouting: “Qlooock!”; as far as the words of their 
language are concerned, α and β’s dispositions are the same – they both apply 
“qlock” to and only to blocks. 
And now, let me ask a question: is it reasonable to assume that, in such a situa-
tion, α and β successfully communicate? I do not see why not. α shouts: 
“Qlooock!” if and only if he wants a block, and when (and only when) β hears α 
shouting: “Qlooock!” he brings him a block. Hence, α gets what he wants on a 
consistent basis, and not out of sheer luck, but because his words make β know it.9 
And this seems to be sufficient to conclude that the two builders understand each 
other and, therefore, that they manage to communicate. To be clear, I am not 
                                                          
7
 The non-factualist reading of Kripkenstein’s skeptical solution sketched in this section 
is, of course, not uncontroversial. For a recent and useful discussion of the issue see Boyd 
2017. 
8
 Here I am assuming that there is no analogue of Kripkenstein’s Paradox in the case of 
desire. In fact, I believe that some dispositional account of (the content of) desire is cor-
rect. 
9
 At least in the sense that he has what Sosa (e.g. 2007, pp. 22-24) calls “animal 
knowledge” of what α wants. Any other, sufficiently weak, reliabilist notion of 
knowledge would, of course, do the job. 
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claiming that the point of α’s shout is to make β know what is going through his 
head; making β know what is going through his head is just a means to get his 
block. Still, α’s shout makes β know what he wants. And this seems to be all we 
need to conclude that there is communication.
10, 11
 Of course, if α or β started to 
find natural some deviant way to use the words of their rudimentary language 
communication would break down. But, as a matter of fact, this does not happen. 
So why bother? 
Now, if the previous remarks are on target, what I have described is a case of 
communication without meaning. And if what I have described is a case of com-
munication without meaning, my demonstrandum is demonstratum: even in a 
world in which there are no meaning facts there can be communication, provided 
that another, quite weak, condition is satisfied. Which condition? Well, the inhab-
itants of the world in question must have sufficiently similar linguistic disposi-
tions. My point is, therefore, that communication does not require that it be objec-
tively correct to use a certain sign in a certain way; all it requires is, roughly, that 
people use the words of their language in suitably related ways.
12
 It is not needed 
that the other ways to use the signs in question be inconsistent with some past 
fact; it suffices that speakers rule them out as irrelevant.
13
 In Wittgenstein’s (1953, 
part 1, § 140) wording: all communication requires is that we be under a psycho-
logical, not a logical, compulsion. 
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 For a somewhat similar view see Gauker 1995, p. 123. 
11
 As I stressed in note 8, I believe that there is no analogue of Kripkenstein’s Paradox in 
the case of desire. That being said, readers uncomfortable with my use of phrases like “α 
gets what he wants” can substitute them with something like “α gets the kind of stone he 
would have picked had he been working on his own” (for some analogous remarks, see 
Skyrms 2010, p. 9). 
12
 See, e.g., the definition of the notion of a signaling system in Lewis 1969, pp. 130-133. 
13
 For some somewhat analogous remarks see Lewis 1969, pp. 37-38. For a more recent 
development of Lewis’ game-theoretic approach to metasemantics see Skyrms 1996, 
chapter 5, 2004, part 2, and 2010. Skyrms (1996, pp. 81-82 and 2004, pp. 49-50) main-
tains that the game-theoretic approach can be used to answer semantic skeptics, though he 
does not explicitly discuss Kripkenstein’s Paradox. For a discussion of the relation be-
tween the game-theoretic approach and Kripkenstein’s Paradox see Sillari 2013. I agree 
with most of what Sillari says; not, however, with his sympathy for straight solutions. My 
own, somewhat tentative, view on the topic is that (1) the game-theoretic approach cannot 
provide a suitable supervenience basis for rule-following, (2) if we are willing to break 
the link between meaning and rule-following, it is very likely that the game-theoretic ap-
proach can provide a suitable supervenience basis for meaning and (3) breaking the link 
between meaning and rule-following is a revisionist but in no sense illicit move. I cannot 
go into this here, but I hope to be able to come back to the issue in the near future. 
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When people have or want to communicate, what they face is a coordination 
problem, and successful communication, when it is achieved, is achieved by 
achieving one of the problem’s coordination equilibria (see Lewis 1969, pp. 122-
124). Successful communication is achieved if the participants in the conversation 
use the relevant signs in roughly the same way. It does not matter whether that is 
the right way. Actually, it does not matter whether there is a right way. The notion 
that there is an objectively correct way to use the words of our language has no 
place whatsoever in our story. The cashier understands what I am saying because 
we use the expression “Two chocolate muffins” in roughly the same way. The 
idea that the way in question must also be the only one consistent with some al-
leged meaning fact is, I think, a by-product of a mistaken conception of the nature 
of the problems human communication raises. 
 
4. Communication without Meaning, Part Two: an Idle Wheel Argument 
The strategy I developed in the previous section is, I think, the neatest and most 
straightforward way to prove my point. After all, what I did was just try to de-
scribe a world in which even if there are no meaning facts, nonetheless there is 
communication. And this really seems to be the most straightforward way to show 
that there can be communication without meaning. However, some readers might 
doubt whether what they have imagined while reading my description of the case 
of α and β was really a Kripkensteinian world, a world in which there is neither 
rule-following, nor rules, nor meaning facts. More precisely, these readers might 
suspect that the reason why at a certain point the world they were building in their 
imagination became a world in which there clearly was communication is that 
they inadvertently built into the situation the needed meaning facts. I believe such 
doubts to be ultimately unwarranted. But I find them natural enough to justify de-
voting some space to developing an alternative strategy, less straightforward but 
maybe rhetorically more effective, to prove my point. This is the strategy I have in 
mind. Instead of describing a world in which there is communication even though 
there are no meaning facts, I will describe a world in which, although there are 
meaning facts, communication does not depend on them. This, of course, entails 
that there can be communication without meaning, so that my point is proved. But 
nowhere in the argument will I ask the reader to imagine Kripkensteinian worlds, 
so that the difficulty I sketched is by-passed. 
Let us start by taking the case of α and β as described in the previous section, 
drop the assumption that the two builders live in a Kripkensteinian world, and 
substitute it with the assumption that they always use the words of their language 
in the wrong way. We assume, for instance, that on day D1, the day on which α 
and β created their language, fact F (which you can imagine as some kind of os-
tensive definition, or as some dispositional fact concerning α and β, or in any oth-
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er way you happen to like – it really does not matter) determined that an applica-
tion of “qlock” is correct if and only if the object in question is a block. And then 
we assume that from day D2 onwards the two builders apply “qlock” only to slabs 
– note that the assumption that α and β have roughly the same linguistic disposi-
tions has not been dropped, so that the idea is that even though the way the two 
builders use the words of their language is wrong, it is at least the same for both of 
them. 
Here, however, we bump into a difficulty. The problem is this: it seems plausi-
ble to assume that after a few days of α and β using “qlock” to refer to slabs a new 
rule will establish itself and “qlock” will just mean slab,14 which would entail that 
from that moment onwards α and β are no longer using the word in question in the 
wrong way. Therefore, instead of assuming that from D2 onwards the two builders 
apply “qlock” only to slabs, it is better to make a slightly more complicated as-
sumption: on D2 α and β start to apply “qlock” only to slabs, but as soon as fact F* 
determines that, from that moment on, an application of “qlock” is correct if and 
only if the object in question is a slab they start to apply “qlock” only to blocks, 
and so on. This way, it is clear that the two builders always use the words of their 
language in the wrong way. 
And now let us ask the obvious question: is it reasonable to assume that, in 
such a situation, α and β successfully communicate? Once again, it seems yes, and 
for more or less the same reasons I gave while discussing our original example. 
On D2 α starts to shout: “Qlooock!” only if he wants a slab and β starts to bring α 
a slab every time he hears him shouting: “Qlooock!”. And when α starts to shout: 
“Qlooock!” only if he wants a block, β starts to bring α a block every time he 
hears him shouting: “Qlooock!”. Hence, α gets what he wants on a consistent ba-
sis, which, once again, seems to be sufficient to conclude that the two builders 
manage to communicate. 
This time, however, there is also another question that we have to ask our-
selves, namely: what grounds communication between α and β? More precisely: is 
it the fact that there is a way in which they should use the words of their lan-
guage? Well, I think it is quite clear that such a question must be answered in the 
negative. The fact grounding communication between α and β must have some-
thing to do with the way in which the two builders actually behave. And the way 
in which α and β actually use the words of their language has clearly nothing to do 
with the way in which they should use them. These correctness conditions are 
nothing more than idle wheels. Just as in the original example, what grounds 
communication is not the fact that α and β do what they should but, rather, the fact 
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 For some analogous remarks see Lewis 1969, pp. 148-149. 
Philosophia, 2019 
11 
that they do approximately the same thing. Their eyes are shut, but they are shut 
in similar ways. 
But if communication between α and β does not depend on, say, the fact that 
there is a way in which “qlock” should be used but, rather, on the fact that they 
use this word in suitably related ways, then there must be a possible world in 
which (1) there is no way in which “qlock” should be used and yet (2) α and β 
manage to communicate, provided that (3) the two builders use the word in ques-
tion in approximately the same way. More in general: there must be a possible 
world in which (1) there are no meaning facts and yet (2) there is communication, 
provided that (3) speakers use the words of their language in suitably related 
ways, which was my demonstrandum. 
Let us take stock. The main goal of Kripkenstein’s skeptical solution is to show 
that meaning talk has a role to play in our lives even if there are no meaning facts. 
In section 2 I argued that this should not be the main goal of a skeptical solution 
to Kripkenstein’s Paradox and that the issue of communication, on which I fo-
cused in the last two sections, is far more important. However, as I have already 
noted, this does not mean that the issue of the fate of meaning talk in a 
Kripkensteinian world is not worth our attention. Furthermore, I believe that what 
I have said in the last two sections has some implications for this latter issue. This 
is why I will conclude the paper with some remarks on this topic. 
 
5. Back to Meaning Talk without Meaning Facts 
I think it is useful to see Kripkenstein’s remarks on semantic discourse (that is: his 
skeptical solution) as an attempt to respond to the following line of reasoning, 
which we can call “the Objection from Meaning Talk”: 
 
Meaning talk is a widespread practice. People often speak of the meaning of 
a word or of the way a given expression should be used. The best explana-
tion of this is that meaning talk is the only, or at least the best, way to solve 
some problem faced by us speakers. For the sake of brevity, let us say that 
the best explanation of the ubiquity of meaning talk is that this kind of dis-
course is an “optimal solution” to some linguistic problem. What problem? 
Well, usually, the linguistic problems that require the introduction of a new 
kind of discourse are what we can call “representation problems”, where a 
linguistic community faces a representation problem if and only if it current-
ly lacks the expressive resources to talk about a given domain of facts. 
Therefore, it is very likely that the linguistic problem relative to which 
meaning talk is an optimal solution is the problem of finding the expressive 
resources to talk about meaning facts. Hence, the very existence of semantic 
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discourse provides evidence for the existence of meaning facts and, there-
fore, for the falsity of Kripkenstein’s skeptical conclusion. 
 
Kripkenstein’s answer to this objection is that the problem which meaning talk is 
supposed to solve is not a representation problem: 
 
We say of someone else that he follows a certain rule when his responses 
agree with our own and deny it when they do not; but what is the utility of 
this practice? The utility is evident and can be brought out by considering 
[…] a man who buys something at the grocer’s. The customer, when he 
deals with the grocer and asks for five apples, expects the grocer to count as 
he does, not according to some bizarre non-standard rule and so, if his deal-
ings with the grocer involve a computation, such as “68 + 57”, he expects 
the grocer’s responses to agree with his own. […] Our entire lives depend 
on countless such interactions, and on the “game” of attributing to others the 
mastery of certain concepts or rules, thereby showing that we expect them to 
behave as we do. […] When the community denies of someone that he is 
following certain rules, it excludes him from various transactions such as 
the one between the grocer and the customer. It indicates that it cannot rely 
on his behavior in such transactions (Kripke 1981, pp. 92-93). 
 
In other words: the linguistic problem relative to which meaning talk is an optimal 
solution is not the problem of finding the expressive resources to talk about mean-
ing facts, but that of certifying someone as reliable with respect to certain transac-
tions. Now, in what follows, I want to call attention to two other possible answers 
to the Objection from Meaning Talk. According to the first, which I will call “the 
Illusion View”, meaning talk is a solution to a representation problem, but (1) it is 
a suboptimal solution and (2) the representation problem in question is not that of 
finding the expressive resources to talk about meaning facts. According to the se-
cond one, which I will call “the Coordination View”, meaning talk is – just as in 
Kripkenstein’s view – an optimal solution to a problem which cannot be viewed 
as a representation problem, but the problem in question is not that of certifying 
someone as reliable with respect to certain transactions. 
Let us start with the Illusion View. First, let us take a step back. In the previous 
two sections I argued that communication is a matter of coordination. α and β 
manage to communicate because they use the words of their language in suitably 
related ways: α uses “qlock” if and only if he wants a block, and β brings α a 
block if and only if he hears him shouting: “Qlooock!”. And the cashier under-
stands what I am saying because we use the expression “Two chocolate muffins” 
in roughly the same way. But how is such coordination achieved? Well, for the 
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sake of simplicity, let us focus on the case of α and β. Hence, the question is: how 
is it that both builders apply “qlock” only to blocks – and “shlab” only to slabs 
and so on? Part of the answer, of course, lies in the fact that the way α uses 
“qlock” has been shaped by the same paradigmatic applications which shaped the 
way β uses that word. But this cannot be the whole of the story, since if 
Kripkenstein is right these applications are in principle consistent with any way to 
use the word in question. What we have to explain, therefore, is how it is that the 
fact that the way α uses “qlock” has been shaped by the same paradigmatic appli-
cations which shaped the way β uses “qlock” leads the two builders to use that 
word in roughly the same way even though the applications in question are in 
principle consistent with an infinite number of alternatives. 
The solution is that (and, once again, I revert to Wittgenstein’s wording) even 
though they do not exert any logical compulsion, the paradigmatic applications in 
question do exert a psychological compulsion on α and β. Both α and β are hard-
wired in such a way that given certain paradigmatic applications, they will find, as 
it were, natural only one way (or only a few ways) to project those applications 
into their future linguistic behavior. All the other ways in which the word in ques-
tion could be used, although in principle legitimate, are just disregarded, or ruled 
out as “too strange”. In our case, of course, things are likely to be more compli-
cated: sometimes we do disregard certain ways to use a word because of our hard-
wiring, but sometimes the reason why we rule out a certain way to use a word as 
too strange is just that we have been trained to disregard certain kinds of rules. In 
our case, hard-wiring and learning probably work together. That being said, in our 
case, too, the paradigmatic applications of a word exert only a psychological, not 
a logical, compulsion. The reason why we all project these paradigmatic applica-
tions in approximately the same way is not that that way is the only correct one; 
the reason is, rather, that that way is the one which, because of our hard-wiring 
and training, we find natural.
15
 
Now, it is on this latter point that the Illusion View focuses in order to explain 
the ubiquity of meaning talk. First, note that if there were only one way to use a 
word consistent with its paradigmatic applications, then we would all have a 
(normative
16
) reason to talk about the way words should be used and, therefore, to 
use the concept of meaning. If Kripkenstein is right, the antecedent of this condi-
tional is false. However, if what I have said about our dispositions to find certain 
ways to use words natural and certain others unnatural is correct, well, something 
in its vicinity is true: even though there are infinitely many ways to use a word 
                                                          
15
 The notion of such an arational, and yet foundational, level is – of course – 
Wittgensteinian in character (see esp. Wittgenstein 1969); however, it dates back to, at 
the very least, Reid 1785. 
16
 For the notion of a normative reason see, e.g., Enoch 2011, pp. 221-222. 
Philosophia, 2019 
14 
which are consistent with its paradigmatic applications, speakers are hard-wired, 
and trained, to find natural only one way (or only a few ways) to project those ap-
plications into their future linguistic behavior. This, of course, does not provide us 
with a (normative) reason to talk about the way words should be used, but it can 
definitely explain why, as a matter of fact, people talk as if there were one: we use 
semantic discourse and we talk about the way the words of our language should 




But if this is why we use meaning talk, it is clear that the problem to which this 
kind of discourse is an answer is not that of finding the expressive resources to 
talk about meaning facts; the problem is that of finding the expressive resources to 
talk about the most natural way to use the words of our language, the coordination 
equilibrium that, as a matter of fact, solves the general problem of human com-
munication. Meaning talk would be a suboptimal solution to this representation 
problem (since it gives a misleading representation of the relevant facts) which we 
end up embracing because of our blindness to all the other ways in which we 
could use the words in question. 
Let us now turn to the Coordination View. I have already stressed that the rea-
son why we disregard certain ways to use a word is likely twofold: it has to do 
both with the way we are hard-wired and with the way we have been trained dur-
ing our childhood. However, it seems clear that, at least sometimes (think about 
color words), this is not yet enough to bring about the amount of coordination 
which successful communication requires. We are hard-wired roughly in the same 
way, we have been trained to disregard the same kind of rules, and we are familiar 
with basically the same paradigmatic applications; and yet, there still are too 
many ways to use the word in question which look rather natural, so that – in or-
der to make communication possible – some of these ways to use the word have 
to be ruled out explicitly. Now, both during this process, whose goal is that of rul-
ing out particular rules, and during the training process through which we learned 
to disregard certain kinds of rules, the myth of the one right way to use the word 
turns out to be incredibly useful – just as the Christian apparatus of God, heaven, 
and hell seems to be the best way to teach a certain kind of people to behave. And 
this seems to offer us another possible explanation for the ubiquity of meaning 
talk, namely: meaning talk is such a widespread practice because it helps maxim-
ize the coordination on which successful communication relies. 
Such a view is far closer than the Illusion View to Kripkenstein’s skeptical so-
lution. After all, both Kripkenstein and the proponent of the Coordination View 
                                                          
17
 Note that when I say that we are blind to the alternatives, what I mean is not just that 
we do not think about the alternatives. What I mean is that even if we were presented 
with an alternative, we would not see it as an alternative. 
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maintain that meaning talk is an optimal solution to a problem which cannot be 
viewed as a representation problem. The only difference has to do with the char-
acterization of the problem in question. In Kripkenstein’s view, the problem 
meaning talk is supposed to solve is that of certifying someone as reliable with re-
spect to certain transactions. According to the Coordination View, the problem is 
that of maximizing the coordination on which successful communication relies. 
The following table should help the reader see how the views I described (the 
Objection from Meaning Talk and the various ways to answer it) are related to 
each other: 
 








that of finding the 
expressive 










that of certifying 
someone as 
reliable with 
respect to certain 
transactions 




that of finding the 
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resources to talk 
about the most 
natural way to use 
















What is the right way to answer the Objection from Meaning Talk? That is 
hard to say. Most likely, the best answer involves elements from both 
Kripkenstein’s skeptical solution and the alternatives sketched in this section. 
That being said, the very existence of various strategies to explain semantic dis-
course without making any reference to meaning facts shows that the mere exist-
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